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Abstract
A large body of literature has provided mixed results on the impact of welfare retrenchments on gov-
ernment support. This article examines whether the impact of welfare retrenchments can be
explained by proximity, i.e. whether or not the retrenched policy is related to people’s everyday lives.
To overcome limitations in previous studies, the empirical approach utilizes a natural experiment with
data from the European Social Survey collected concurrently with a salient retrenchment reform of
the education grant system in Denmark. The results confirm that people proximate to a welfare policy
react substantially stronger to retrenchment reforms than the general public. Robustness and placebo
tests further show that the results are not caused by non-personal proximities or satisfaction levels
not related to the reform and the government. In sum, the findings speak to a growing body of litera-
ture interested in the impact of government policies on mass public.
In contemporary societies, welfare policies draw a high
degree of public support (Blekesaune and Quadagno,
2003). However, governments face demographic and
economic challenges making retrenchment reforms of
popular policies an often-used policy instrument. Thus,
while cherished welfare policies are rooted in mass pol-
icy preferences (Brooks and Manza, 2006a, b), govern-
ments still pursue retrenchment reforms of welfare
policies (Pierson, 1994; Allan and Scruggs, 2004;
Hacker, 2004; Vis and van Kersbergen, 2007).
Accordingly, welfare retrenchment reforms are not lim-
ited to non-salient policy domains with reduced atten-
tion from the press and the public, but also popular
policies such as healthcare and education. This has led
to scholarly debates about the extent to which govern-
ments are in fact adversely affected by pursuing such
policies and whether they can actually benefit from pur-
suing welfare retrenchments (Giger and Nelson, 2010;
Elmelund-Præstekær and Emmenegger, 2012).
Recent studies interested in the public response to wel-
fare retrenchments provide important insights to how and
when the public reacts to government reforms, and a
growing body of literature examines the electoral conse-
quences of welfare retrenchments on government support
(e.g. Armingeon and Giger, 2008; Giger, 2010, 2012;
Giger and Nelson, 2010, 2013; Schumacher et al. 2013;
Elmelund-Præstekær et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2017).
Overall, the literature has provided mixed evidence on the
impact of welfare reforms, and a key contribution is that
people do not always punish governments for welfare
retrenchments. Although there is some evidence that the
public on average reacts to welfare retrenchments and
punishes the government for such policy choices (Giger,
2010), the public does not react to welfare retrenchments
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in an unconditional manner (Armingeon and Giger,
2008). Recent studies show that the conditional punish-
ment can be explained by communication strategies such
as how governments pursue reforms (Elmelund-Præstekær
and Emmenegger, 2012) and individual-level characteris-
tics such as whether voters are interested in social policies
(Giger, 2012).
Thus, the impact of welfare retrenchments might not
be as direct and strong as theoretically expected, and while
the literature has documented some of the dynamics shap-
ing how people react to government policies, we do not
fully understand when welfare retrenchments matter for
government support. The contribution of this article is to
resolve and test an important part of this puzzle, namely,
the relevance of how proximate welfare reforms are to
people’s everyday lives (as proposed by Soss and Schram,
2007). In short, most studies on welfare retrenchments
examine how policies have implications for the general
electorate with limited information on how proximate
people are to the policy being retrenched. To overcome
this limitation, we provide a fine-grained test and examine
in a natural experiment whether people with a proximate
relation to the policy being retrenched will react more
strongly to welfare reforms relative to the public less
proximate to the retrenchment.
This approach follows recent studies interested in the
heterogeneous effects of welfare retrenchments (de Vries
and Hobolt, 2013; Lindh, 2015; Munoz et al., 2014),
and in particular how differences in personal proximity
shape public responses to welfare policies (Soss and
Schram, 2007; Hedegaard, 2014; Lu¨, 2014). In this con-
text, we expect that people react more strongly to
retrenchments to policies they are proximate to, and the
general public, not proximate to welfare reforms, are
less responsive to welfare retrenchments. Consequently,
when studies do find general punishments in the elector-
ate, these are potentially shaped by a strong response by
the people being proximate to the welfare policy.
To test this in a systematic manner, we focus on a
welfare reform in the domain of education initiated by
the Danish government in 2013. This reform was pre-
sented on 19 February 2013, and led to cuts on 2.2 bil-
lion DKK (295 million EUR) in the state education grant
system. Coincidentally, the reform was presented while
the European Social Survey (ESS) was doing fieldwork
in Denmark, allowing us to create a counterfactual
group for not only the public, i.e. people interviewed
before and after the reform, but also for the people
proximate to the retrenched policy.
The methodological approach overcomes three cru-
cial obstacles in the literature: first, the issue of a reliable
counterfactual, as we can exploit variation in the groups
being studied; secondly, the issue of reverse causation,
as governments might be more likely to retrench policies
targeted people less satisfied with the government in the
first place; and thirdly, the issue of the time frame, as we
can zoom in on a short period of time with a specific
welfare reform, and not a wide period with multiple pol-
icies retrenching and expanding the welfare state. This
also ensures that macro level confounders such as eco-
nomic and social developments are less of a concern. In
sum, this strategy provides unique estimates on the
causal effects of welfare reforms on the public with
implications for the literature interested in government
policies and public opinion dynamics.
In addition, the novel design and unique data makes
it possible to test the relevance of alternative theoretical
explanations on the impact of welfare retrenchments on
the public. In particular, by using measures previously
linked to social policy preferences, we are able to exam-
ine whether alternative notions of proximity such as pol-
icy socialization, labour market risks and family
solidarity condition the impact of the reform on govern-
ment support. Last, placebo measures substantiate that
the results are not caused by differences not directly
related to the reform and the government.
Welfare Retrenchments and Personal
Proximity
People attribute credit and blame to governments for
their actions and such assessments have direct implica-
tions for the support of governments (Marsh and Tilley,
2010). However, people are multi-issue oriented, have
limited capabilities for information processing (Zaller,
1992; Lodge and Taber, 2013), and do not possess com-
plete knowledge on all public policies and their conse-
quences (Mettler, 2011). Consequently, there is no
reason to expect that people will have identical experi-
ences with welfare policies and respond in a homoge-
nous manner to changes in policies.
Over the years, several studies have examined the
electoral impact of welfare retrenchment reforms on
government support (Armingeon and Giger, 2008;
Giger, 2010, 2012, Giger and Nelson, 2010, 2013;
Schumacher et al., 2013; Elmelund-Præstekær et al.,
2015; Lee et al., 2017). However, these studies have one
crucial aspect in common, namely, that they study how
the general public reacts to policies with no or limited
attention to the proximity to such policies. Thus, the lit-
erature focuses mostly on the aggregate response,
including people with no personal relation to the policy
being retrenched, and as a result, it lacks a systematic
test of whether the proximity to a policy matters.
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Policies are for some people proximate and provide
tangible personal relations to political institutions
(Kumlin, 2004; Bruch et al., 2010). More generally, wel-
fare policies have feedback effects on mass publics
(Mettler and Soss, 2004; Campbell, 2012; Lerman and
McCabe, 2017), and how proximate a policy is to the
public is expected to substantially condition its impact
(Soss and Schram, 2007; Hedegaard, 2014). Accordingly,
Soss and Schram (2007) theorize how a proximity dimen-
sion matter for whether or not welfare reforms will have
any effect on the public. In this framework, proximity is
defined as how closely the policy is directly related to peo-
ple’s everyday lives.
The concern raised by scholars interested in the per-
sonal proximity to reforms is that when policy effects
are studied in a population as aggregate, average effects
with limited attention to how proximate the policy is,
we underestimate the actual impact and relevance of
public policies (MacLean, 2011). Thus, the theoretical
expectation is that a high degree of proximity, i.e. that
people have individual experiences with a policy in their
everyday lives, is crucial in our understanding of when
and how a policy will matter for the public.
There are two reasons to expect that those proximate to
a policy will react more strongly to retrenchment reforms.
First, people proximate to a policy have personal interests
in ensuring the preservation of the policy they benefit from.
Pierson (1994) describes how policies create groups of
recipients with a strong interest in the preservation of the
policies, whereas the economic benefits for the tax-payers
of retrenching a policy are diffuse and less direct. Secondly,
people differ in the extent to which they are aware of poli-
cies, and the more proximate a person is to a policy, the
more likely that he/she will respond to an unpopular policy.
Lu¨ (2014), for example, finds that education policy benefits
shape attitudes towards government responsibility as well
as trust in the government in China, but only for those who
were aware of the reform (for more on the importance of
reform awareness, see Hetling et al., 2008). In sum, study-
ing welfare retrenchments at the aggregate level with no
information on the proximity to the retrenchments does not
provide evidence on how voters with differential experien-
ces with policies react to welfare retrenchments.
For this reason, recent studies have devoted closer
attention to how proximity or policy awareness matters
for the impact of welfare reforms. Bendz (2015) shows
that attention to politics in the domain of healthcare, meas-
ured with proximity variables such as geography and per-
ceived health status, shape the impact of policies. Munoz
et al. (2014) find that public-sector workers in Spain
reacted strongly to an austerity package and increased their
level of political participation. de Vries and Hobolt (2013)
find, using a reform with social spending cuts in child care
in the Netherlands in 1995, that those proximate to the
policy were affected more strongly and punished the gov-
ernment accordingly. Giger (2012) examines 19 elections
between 2001 and 2006 and finds that government popu-
larity is lower in countries which pursued welfare retrench-
ment reforms, but the effect is limited to the citizens
interested in social policy.
To summarize, in line with the policy feedback litera-
ture interested in the personal experiences with welfare
policies, proximity is expected to condition the impact
of welfare retrenchments on government support. For
people who are proximate to a policy being retrenched,
the government will be evaluated more negatively,
whereas the public not proximate to a policy will not
punish the government.
Education Retrenchments and Public
Opinion Dynamics
To test the proximity hypothesis, we focus on how welfare
retrenchments in the domain of education matter for gov-
ernment support. Before turning to the empirical strategy,
it is crucial to describe the policy domain and the implica-
tions for the study of proximity and public opinion
dynamics. While studies on welfare reforms usually have
focused on social policies (Rhodes, 2015), education poli-
cies are closer to the median voter and thus more likely to
call for a response in the electorate (Jensen, 2012). Thus,
education is a salient and popular part of the welfare state,
and is a theoretically justified case to expect a general
government punishment for welfare retrenchments.
Contrary to social policies, e.g. labour market related
programmes, which are less popular among the median
voter, education policies are popular and salient policies
with a high level of support independent of socio-
economic status (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Jensen, 2012).
However, that being said, education policies consist of
complex redistributive dynamics (Garritzmann, 2017),
making the impact of the partisan composition of a gov-
ernment on public education spending less clear
(Garritzmann and Seng, 2016).
Accordingly, we need to disentangle the distinct
ways in which people can be proximate to welfare
retrenchments in the domain of education. Based on the
literature interested in how people form attitudes
towards social policies, we can derive additional expect-
ations regarding how education policies are linked to
people’s response to welfare retrenchments. In other
words, in the domain of education, there are potential
ways in which welfare retrenchments might matter
for government support beyond the direct personal
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proximity. Importantly, there are theoretical reasons to
believe that personal proximity might not be the most
crucial factor explaining whether people respond to wel-
fare retrenchments.
First, people have previous experiences with educa-
tion policies. Policies create specific norms that socialize
people with implications for how they perceive them-
selves and the role of the government (Jæger, 2009).
Garritzmann (2015), for example, finds that education
policies have positive feedback effects, making educa-
tion policies difficult to retrench. Thus, education poli-
cies themselves shape how people react to reforms. In
this context, we will examine whether prior proximity,
i.e. the extent to which people have past experiences
with education policies, shapes the response.
Secondly, people’s socio-economic positions can con-
dition whether they are more likely to respond to wel-
fare retrenchments. While retrenchments within
education policies are less direct in their socio-economic
effects, people with a greater dependency on the welfare
state, e.g. those more likely to encounter labour market
risks (Rehm, 2009), can potentially be more likely to
punish the government for retrenching welfare policies.
Thirdly, while some people have direct proximate rela-
tions to a policy being retrenched, other people are proxi-
mate to the people being affected. Accordingly, there are
different degrees of proximity to government policies
(Hedegaard, 2014), and in particular proximity within the
family might explain whether people respond to welfare
retrenchments or not. Previous research finds that inter-
generational solidarity within the family helps explaining
differences in social policy preferences, and that family sol-
idarity matters for older people’s attitudes towards public
childcare provisions (Goerres and Tepe, 2010).
Overall, the focus on additional expectations beyond
personal proximity is relevant for two reasons. First, to
examine the potential relevance of less direct and alter-
native types of proximity in understanding when people
respond to welfare reforms in their overall assessment of
the government. In other words, there are ways in which
people might respond to welfare reforms beyond their
own proximate relation. Secondly, to ensure that the
relevance of personal proximity is not confounded by
other types of proximity. Thus, by using different meas-
ures and conducting a series of additional tests, we can
test whether it is in fact personal proximity with the pol-
icy which matter for the response.
Method and Data
To examine the theoretical expectations, we utilize a
welfare reform initiated by the Danish government in
2013 of the state education grant system. This reform
was presented on 19 February 2013, and led to cuts for
2.2 billion DKK in the state education grant system.
Importantly, the reform was presented while the 6th
round of the ESS was collecting data in Denmark. This
provides a novel opportunity to examine how people
evaluated the government before and after the reform
for not only the general public, but in particular the peo-
ple who were proximate to the education policy and
thus the state education grant system. Crucially, the edu-
cation grant system is not a means-tested service, mak-
ing people undergoing education at age 18 and above
eligible to the grant. Accordingly, in this context, prox-
imity is defined as a person who is currently undergoing
education.
The key features of the reform were lower benefits as
well as stricter requirements. More specifically, the
reform shortened the period of the state education grant,
led to additional requirements of study progression to be
eligible for the grant, requirements for the universities to
improve student completion times, changed state educa-
tion grants for people living with their parents and
changed the regulation of the state education grant to a
transfer payment. Hence, the reform of the state educa-
tion grant system is a retrenchment reform with no fea-
tures of welfare expansions. Importantly, the reform
was not communicated in relation to expansion reforms,
e.g. presented as part of a greater package with multiple
different reforms. This would bias the estimates of the
reform’s effect, as other parts of the electorate could be
exposed to welfare expansions (Lee et al., 2017).
The context of the study is Denmark in 2013.
Denmark is a universal welfare state with a multi-party
system often lead by minority coalition governments
with one or more centre parties. The government in
2013 consisted of the Social Democrats, the Social
Liberal Party, and the Socialist People’s Party. The edu-
cation reform was presented by the Minister of
Education, Morten Østergaard, from the Social Liberal
Party. The government was known for pursuing multi-
ple unexpected and unpopular reforms related to differ-
ent policy areas in the election period from 2011 to
2015, but in this specific study period the primary focus
was on education and not other salient reforms that
could confound the results (for a description of the polit-
ical context of the reform and the public’s education
spending preferences in Denmark, see Supplementary
Material A).
The reform received extensive coverage in the mass
media. Figure 1 shows the coverage of the reform in the
press in form of articles mentioning the reform of the
state education grant system as well as retrenchment in
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the nationwide coverage. The figure shows that there is
an increase in the coverage of the reform after its presen-
tation. This substantiates that people interviewed after
19 February to a greater extent will be exposed to the
reform than people interviewed prior to 19 February.
Noteworthy, political reforms are not exogenous to
the political process, and there was coverage related to
reforms and retrenchments prior to 19 February. This
can induce a bias in the estimated causal effect of the
reform. However, three factors are relevant, making this
less of a concern. First, it is implausible that the public
never will be treated with some sort of political agenda,
and hence the counterfactual of interest here is not nec-
essarily a context without any talk about welfare
reforms. Secondly, if people in the control group, i.e.
people interviewed prior to 19 February, are exposed to
welfare reforms, this will provide a more conservative
estimate of the welfare reform under study. Thirdly, in a
reading of the articles covering the issue prior to the pre-
sentation of the reform, we found no evidence indicating
that people would know that the retrenchment reform
would be presented on 19 February 2013 (see
Supplementary Material B).
In the beginning of 2013, the ESS collected data for
the 6th round in Denmark. While the ESS was intended
to question citizens about a variety of non-political and
political issues, it was by coincidence conducted, while
the Danish government presented the reform of the state
education grant system. This provides a novel sample in
which only some people are interviewed after the pre-
sentation of the education reform. The first subject was
interviewed on 11 January, and the last subject was
interviewed on 2 May (for the frequency of interviews in
the study period, see Supplementary Material C).
The question of interest is whether or not people
interviewed after the reform are less satisfied with the
government, and in particular whether people under-
going education react more strongly. To test this, we
need a parameter capturing the heterogeneous effect of
the reform. Accordingly, R indicates whether or not a
unit is exposed to the reform, where Ri, for Ri 2 0; 1gf ,
shows exposure status for subject i. Whether or not a
person is interviewed after the presentation of the
reform is based on the day of interview, Ii. Thus, sub-
jects interviewed prior to 19 February 2013 are not
exposed to the reform, whereas subjects interviewed
after 19 February 2013 are. Subjects interviewed on 19
February are excluded.
Ri ¼
1; Ii > Feb 19
0; Ii < Feb 19
(
The heterogeneous effect estimator is given by d in:
yit ¼ aþ bEi þ cRit þ dEiRit þ it
In the equation, y is government popularity for unit i
at time t. E is a binary variable indicating whether or
not the person is undergoing education. a is the average
government popularity for people not undergoing edu-
cation prior to the reform. b is the difference in average
government popularity between people undergoing edu-
cation and those not undergoing education prior to the
reform. y is the difference in average government popu-
larity before and after the reform conditional upon edu-
cational status.
Whether a person is undergoing education, as the
indicator of whether or not the reform is proximate, is
measured with a question about whether the respond-
ent, within the past 7 days, has been undergoing educa-
tion (for question wordings on all measures, see
Supplementary Material D). Importantly, this measure
excludes people undergoing education paid by an
employer. Not all people undergoing education will be
or feel proximate to the education policy and not all
people undergoing education will know about the
reform, but it provides a very strong measure on
whether or not the person, on average, has a proximate
relation to the policy domain being retrenched relative
to the general public. Again, as noted, the state educa-
tion grant system is a universal policy in so far that all
students have access to and benefit from the policy.
Figure 1. The coverage of the education reform, 2013
Note: The figure shows the discontinuity in the coverage of the
media coverage of the reform as the government presented it.
Obtained through the Danish media database Infomedia. All
articles in the nationwide coverage (Arbejderen, Berlingske,
BT, Børsen, Ekstra Bladet, Information, Jyllands-Posten,
Kristeligt Dagblad and Politiken) mentioning ‘SU-reform*’
(state education grant reform) and ‘nedskæring*’ (retrench-
ment). For additional information on the media coverage of the
reform in the study period and the individual articles, see
Supplementary Material B.
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Last, we assume that education status is time-invariant
(indicated by the lack of a time indicator in education
status).
This approach addresses three challenges in the exist-
ing literature. First, reforms rarely affect the whole elec-
torate, but rather groups, making the reform a salient
issue for this specific group (in this case indicated
by Ei). As described above, we might underestimate the
impact of reforms when they are targeted specific
groups. Thus, this approach allows us to examine the
causal heterogeneity in the effects of welfare retrench-
ments on government support.
Secondly, existing studies look for the most part at
the effects of reforms between elections. Governments
pursue several reforms over an election cycle, and these
reforms are not exclusively policy retrenchments
(Klitgaard et al., 2015). In addition, governments face
electoral incentives to pursue unpopular reforms in the
beginning of an election period, underestimating the
effect of individual reforms on the electorate when
studying election results. Furthermore, other events tak-
ing place between elections, e.g. macroeconomic down-
turns, proves it difficult to estimate the causal effect of
retrenchment reforms. In this study, we address the
problem by limiting the time interval to the specific
period before and after the presentation of a reform
(given by Rit), taking institutional, political, economic,
and cultural factors into account by design.
Thirdly, only a limited number of studies compare
the effects of reforms to an explicit and realistic baseline
(i.e. the outcome variable in the absence of a reform).
To understand how a political reform affect citizens and
especially different groups of citizens, we need to com-
pare the effect of a reform to a comparable group that is
unaffected or only to a minimal extent proximate to the
reform. In the present study we use the subjects surveyed
just before the presentation of a reform as the baseline
government support. In addition, several outcome meas-
ures not directly related to the reform and government
support, i.e. life satisfaction, democracy satisfaction and
economy satisfaction, makes it possible to test whether
the results reflect a general dissatisfaction with a variety
of outcomes, and not a punishment of the government.
To further ensure that the groups interviewed before
and after the reform are comparable and of equal size,
the data are preprocessed with a 1:1 nearest neighbour
matching with replacement (subject to a caliper con-
straint). While this technique takes observed differences
into account (Ho et al., 2007; Sekhon, 2009), it is
important to note that it does not in and by itself sub-
stantiate a conditionally exogenous assignment to the
retrenchment reform (Samii, 2016). However, the
design-features described above combined with the
matching procedure provide a satisfactory set-up for
studying how people react to welfare retrenchments
(for information on the matching procedure, see
Supplementary Material E). The specific variables
chosen for the matching procedure and as covariates in
the estimated models are gender, age, education level,
subjective class, political interest, political news con-
sumption and religiosity.
The outcome variable of interest is government pop-
ularity. We use a direct measure of the extent to which
the respondent is satisfied with the national government.
Noteworthy, the ESS does not have measures on vote
intention. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the out-
come variable.
The outcome variable has a mean of 4.77 with a
standard deviation of 2.23 (for summary statistics for all
variables on the full and matched data, see
Supplementary Material F). In sum, the distribution of
the outcome shows that ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression is suitable for our analysis with no floor or
ceiling effects.
The next section will test whether people interviewed
after the government presented the reform, on average,
were less satisfied with the government, and in particu-
lar whether the people being proximate to the education
policy reacted more strongly. In addition, we focus on
Figure 2. Distribution of government satisfaction
Note: Distribution of government satisfaction. Greater values
indicate greater levels of satisfaction with the government.
For question wording and descriptive statistics, see
Supplementary Material D and F.
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alternative types of proximity, measures and models to
examine the robustness and sensitivity of the results.
Results
Table 1 examines, in four models, how the public
reacted to the education reform. In the first model, we
estimate the average effect of the reform on the public’s
satisfaction with the government, i.e. all subjects
included in the analysis. The effect is -0.30 with a stand-
ard error of 0.13, indicating an overall significant effect
of the reform on people’s evaluation of the government.
More specifically, people interviewed after the presenta-
tion of the retrenchment reform were significantly less
satisfied with the government. This lends support to the
expectations that governments are adversely affected by
pursuing retrenchment reforms. In the second model, we
include the set of covariates also used in the matching
procedure. The model shows that this has no implica-
tions for the results or the interpretation.
Next, we turn to the heterogeneous effects of the
reform. To test whether the decrease in government sup-
port is shaped by proximity, the third model includes
the interaction term between the reform and proximity.
This model confirms that the decrease in support is stat-
istically significant. The fourth model further includes
the covariates and again confirm that this inclusion has
no implication for the coefficient or statistical test.
However, and importantly, the statistical significance
should not be interpreted as substantial significance
(Bernardi et al., 2017). In substantial terms, people
undergoing education became 0.73 less satisfied with
the government in the wake of the reform on the 11-
point scale compared to the general public. In compari-
son, this effect is similar to the estimated difference in
government satisfaction between people with a primary
education and a tertiary education. While this shows
that welfare retrenchments matter for people proximate
to the retrenchments, it also shows that the effects on
the average public support are not severe and devastat-
ing for the government.
To test whether the results are shaped by the choices
made in the matching procedure, the results from the
full and matched sample were compared, and the results
were estimated with different calipers, different func-
tional forms and alternative matching procedures. These
results are substantively similar to the results presented
above (see Supplementary Material G for the models).
In sum, the retrenchment reform made the public less
satisfied with the government. However, this effect is
driven by people who in their daily lives have experien-
ces with the policy that was being retrenched. This lends
support to the main expectation, namely, that proximity
is an important condition for whether or not a retrench-
ment reform will elicit a public response.
Alternative Measures and Models
To ensure that the effects are not driven by the fact that
people interviewed after the reform are more satisfied
on aspects not directly related to the government and
the reform, we estimated the same models with placebo
satisfaction outcomes. In other words, we are interested
in outcomes for which differences could account for the
Table 1. Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, OLS regression
Average effect Average effect, w. covariates Conditional effect Conditional effect, w. covariates
Reform 0.30** (0.13) 0.29** (0.12) 0.18 (0.14) 0.16 (0.14)
Education 0.11 (0.24) 0.39 (0.27)
Reform  Education 0.71** (0.34) 0.73** (0.33)
Male 0.11 (0.13) 0.10 (0.13)
Age 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005)
Education level 0.17*** (0.04) 0.17*** (0.04)
Subjective class 0.20*** (0.04) 0.20*** (0.04)
Pol. interest 0.11 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09)
Pol. news 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.05)
Religiosity 0.10*** (0.02) 0.10*** (0.02)
Ideology 0.17*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03)
Constant 4.92*** (0.09) 3.59*** (0.39) 4.90*** (0.10) 3.47*** (0.43)
Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
R2 0.004 0.10 0.01 0.10
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is government satisfaction (0–10), with greater values
indicating greater levels of satisfaction with the government.
*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
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results but should not be shaped by the education
reform. Luckily, the ESS includes questions on satisfac-
tion measures such as satisfaction with life, the econ-
omy, and democracy. Table 2 shows the results of these
tests.
We find no evidence in any of the models that people
interviewed after the presentation of the reform were
less satisfied on measures not directly related to the
reform and the government. Thus, it is not the case that
people undergoing education were less or more satisfied
on unrelated measures after the presentation of the
reform. In other words, the results provide reassuring
evidence that it was in fact the reform that changed peo-
ple’s level of satisfaction with the government, and not
overall satisfaction differences in the period being
studied.
Next, to examine the importance of the day of the
interview, and especially potential announcement effects
prior to the presentation of the reform, we pursued three
additional strategies. First, the key results were esti-
mated with a statistical control for the distance in days
to the presentation of the reform. Secondly, the average
effect of the reform was estimated with a sharp regres-
sion discontinuity design identification. Thirdly, the
effects were estimated with all dates prior to the reform
using only people interviewed before the presentation of
the reform. The results from the three strategies provide
additional evidence for the interpretations presented
above, and in particular that the results are unlikely to
be biased by announcements made prior to 19 February
(for the results and further details, see Supplementary
Material H, I, and J).
Alternative Types of Proximity
While we have studied the effects on the people with a
direct proximity to education policies, alternative prox-
imity measures might condition the impact of the
reform, namely, that of previous proximity (a policy
socialization effect), family proximity (a solidarity
effect), and labour market proximity (an unemployment
effect).
To measure previous proximity, we rely on variation
in the level of education measured with the International
Standard Classification of Education, where people with
more education have a greater experience with educa-
tion policies. To measure family proximity, we con-
structed a measure with information on whether a
respondent’s partner currently is undergoing education
and whether there is a child in the household at the age
most likely to receive the state education grant (from 18
to 25). Last, to measure differences in labour market
proximity, we use a similar measure as for undergoing
education, but for having been doing paid work within
the past 7 days, i.e. a measure of whether or not the
respondent is likely to be unemployed.
Table 3 presents models similar to the models pre-
sented above with the addition of the alternative types
of proximity. The models show two key findings. First,
none of the alternative proximity measures condition
the impact of the reform on government popularity.
Secondly, the direct proximity effect remains significant
across all models taking the interaction between the
alternative proximity measures and the reform into
account.
Table 2.Welfare retrenchment and placebo satisfaction outcomes, OLS regression
Life Economy Democracy
Reform 0.14 (0.09) 0.05 (0.13) 0.02 (0.12)
Education 0.49*** (0.18) 0.11 (0.25) 0.10 (0.23)
Reform  Education 0.12 (0.22) 0.12 (0.30) 0.30 (0.28)
Male 0.16* (0.09) 0.16 (0.12) 0.12 (0.11)
Age 0.01*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
Education level 0.02 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.10*** (0.03)
Subjective class 0.24*** (0.03) 0.25*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04)
Pol. interest 0.11* (0.06) 0.05 (0.09) 0.25*** (0.08)
Pol. news 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05) 0.12*** (0.05)
Religiosity 0.001 (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Ideology 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02)
Constant 6.51*** (0.29) 3.41*** (0.40) 5.31*** (0.37)
Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186
R2 0.08 0.05 0.06
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is government satisfaction (0–10), with greater values
indicating greater levels of satisfaction with the government.
*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
8 European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 0, No. 0
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/esr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/esr/jcx081/4728885
by Templeman Library, University of Kent,  E.G.Larsen@kent.ac.uk
on 11 December 2017
Overall, this substantiates that it is the personal
proximity to the policy being retrenched and not alter-
native proximities to education policies that drives the
response. In Supplementary Material K, we further
show that prospective family proximity, i.e. having kids
below the age threshold of the state education grant,
and other types of labour market proximities, did not
condition the impact of the reform. Last, to ensure that
the results are not explained by education status being a
proxy for other factors, e.g. age differences, we esti-
mated the main models after employing the matching
procedure on education status (see Supplementary
Material M).
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Although vote-seeking governments might pursue
retrenchments to gain votes (Elmelund-Præstekær and
Emmenegger, 2012), the findings in the welfare
retrenchment literature on how the public actually
responds to welfare retrenchments are mixed. People
punish governments for welfare retrenchments in some
cases, but not always. The causal evidence presented
here shows that one reason for this discrepancy can be
attributed to the fact that not all citizens react in an
identical manner to welfare retrenchments. Based on the
policy feedback literature interested in welfare reforms
(Soss and Schram, 2007), the expectation tested and
documented is that the impact of retrenchment reforms
is stronger for those proximate to the policy. In short,
the public’s proximity to a policy makes it hard for gov-
ernments to retrench the policy without a strong and
negative reaction from the public.
Since welfare policies are popular and often targeting
specific groups with strong interests in their preservation,
the electoral dynamics related to welfare retrenchments
are distinct from welfare expansions (Pierson, 1996).
Using a rare case of a major welfare reform presented dur-
ing the collection of high-quality data, the findings pre-
sented here show that governments cannot, at least under
some circumstances, retrench welfare policies without a
response from those who are proximate to the policy being
retrenched. Hence, while governments can pursue distinct
blame avoidance strategies when retrenching welfare poli-
cies (Pierson, 1994; Lindbom 2007), the results substanti-
ate that government policies do not go unnoticed in the
public. However, the evidence also suggests that not all
voters react to government policies in an equal manner.
This provides latitude for strategic governments and sup-
port the interpretation that policy makers can target
retrenchments to specific parts of the electorate.
The empirical approach employed in this article uti-
lized reform exposure in a quasi-random manner.
Table 3.Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, different proximity measures, OLS regression
Education level Family Paid work Full model
Reform 0.24 (0.32) 0.18 (0.15) 0.42* (0.23) 0.39 (0.34)
Education 0.37 (0.27) 0.11 (0.27) 0.08 (0.30) 0.12 (0.30)
Reform  Education 0.71** (0.34) 0.75** (0.34) 0.58* (0.35) 0.60* (0.36)
Education level 0.16*** (0.05) 0.19*** (0.05)
Reform  Education level 0.02 (0.07) 0.003 (0.07)
Family 0.03 (0.22) 0.07 (0.22)
Reform  Family 0.07 (0.31) 0.001 (0.31)
Paid work 0.32 (0.20) 0.44** (0.21)
Reform  Paid work 0.39 (0.27) 0.34 (0.28)
Male 0.10 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) 0.003 (0.13) 0.11 (0.13)
Age 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.0002 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01)
Subjective class 0.20*** (0.04) 0.24*** (0.04) 0.25*** (0.04) 0.21*** (0.04)
Pol. interest 0.10 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09)
Pol. news 0.04 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
Religiosity 0.10*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.10*** (0.02)
Ideology 0.17*** (0.03) 0.19*** (0.03) 0.19*** (0.03) 0.17*** (0.03)
Constant 3.52*** (0.46) 3.90*** (0.43) 4.19*** (0.46) 3.82*** (0.49)
Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is government satisfaction (0–10), with greater values
indicating greater levels of satisfaction with the government.
*P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
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Although natural experiments providing as-if random
exposure to welfare retrenchments are beneficial, as
they can generate causal evidence when the possibilities
for conducting randomized controlled trials are limited,
there are specific limitations. First, the test presented
here does not disentangle the different potential ways in
which the personal proximity to a policy matters, but
simply shows that those being proximate to a policy
react more strongly to welfare reforms retrenching the
policy. For example, if the reform being studied here
affected recipients immediately, i.e. from one day to the
other, one might expect that the response would be
stronger (Garritzmann, 2015).
Secondly, just as the contribution to the literature is
a causal test of the proximity argument, the present
study has noteworthy constraints on the generalizability
of the findings. Most importantly, the results are derived
from a context of austerity, and previous research
suggests that the public is less likely to punish the
government for cutbacks in education policies under
such conditions (Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2017).
Thirdly, the reform was presented in the Danish context
of a multiparty system, where responsibility attribution
is unclear. In the present case, only one party ended up
voting against the reform. The lack of criticism from the
opposition with regard to the retrenchment reform
might have resulted in less punishment compared to a
scenario where the opposition had provided a counter-
frame to the reform (Green-Pedersen, 2001; Elmelund-
Præstekær et al., 2015).
To conclude, not all voters punish the government
for welfare retrenchments. The evidence presented here
substantiates when welfare retrenchments matter for
government support, and in particular that governments
are punished when the public is proximate to the
policies being retrenched. Consequently, despite the
popularity of welfare policies, people might not punish
the government unconditionally for pursuing salient
retrenchments. When studies find that retrenchments
do not result in a direct and harsh punishment of the
government, this can be partially explained by the
fact that not all people have a proximate relation to
the policy. To understand whether or not welfare
retrenchments matter for the support of governments,
we need to take the composition of the public into
account and particularly the proximity to the policies
being retrenched.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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A. Case: Context of the state education grant reform 
The state education grant reform was part of a broader welfare agenda of the government as described 
in the government coalition agreement from 2011 (The Government, 2011). The coalition agreement 
described that the government was a so-called reform government that would pursue multiple re-
forms, including education reforms (from the coalition agreement in Danish: ÒDanmark har fet en 
reformregering. Vi vil gennemf¿re reformer af uddannelserne. Vi vil gennemf¿re en skattereform. Vi 
vil gennemf¿re en v¾kstreform. Reformer, som fremtidssikrer Danmark.Ó).  
The government announced in 2011 that it would invest in education to ensure the quality of 
the education system and the welfare state, and it made it clear that it would not change the state 
education grant system, but keep it in its current form and reform other parts of the education system 
(from the coalition agreement in Danish: ÒDerfor vil regeringen bevare SU-systemet i dets nuv¾rende 
form, men unders¿ge mulige positive incitamenter indenfor SU-systemet, der kan f unge til bde at 
begynde tidligere p deres uddannelse og g¿re uddannelsen hurtigere f¾rdig end i dag.Ó). 
The education reform was presented on February 19, 2013, as a press release from the Ministry 
of Higher Education and Science (2013). The government made it clear that the aim of the reform 
was to make it more attractive for students to complete their education more quickly and to improve 
public finances. 
In order to examine the publicÕs preferences toward education, and in order to compare it to 
other policy domains, I use data from the Danish National Election Study 2011 (Stubager et al., 
2013). This survey includes questions related to whether the government spend too much, a suitable 
amount or too little on the specific policy domain.  
Figure A.1 show the spending preferences across the 14 policies. Overall, a majority of the 
public wants more spending on education, and only a very limited number of respondents say they 
want the government to spend less on education. This mimics the results for other policies such as 
child care, health care and home care.   
Figure A.1: Public spending preferences, 2011, 14 policies 
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B. Case: Nationwide media coverage of the reform  
There was an increase in the nationwide coverage of the state education grant system retrenchments 
after the presentation of the reform (cf. Figure 1 in the main text). Figure B.1 shows that there was an 
increase in the general retrenchment reform coverage (Panel A) and that the relative share of the 
mentioning of the state education grant reform in the overall reform coverage was greater after the 
presentation of the reform (Panel B).  
 
Figure B.1: Nationwide media coverage of retrenchment reforms 
 
Note: Number of articles mentioning reforms in the nationwide coverage (Panel A) and percentage 
of articles mentioning the state education grant reform of all articles mentioning reforms. Same col-
lection procedure as for Figure 1 described in the main text. 
 
The overall retrenchment reform coverage in the study period peaked in the week after the 
presentation of the reform. Furthermore, of all the articles mentioning retrenchment reforms after the 
presentation of the state education grant reform, 60% of the articles mentioned the state education 
grant reform. Thus, it is unlikely that other reforms dominated the coverage in the weeks after the 





































































































the presentation of the reform, emphasizing that the counterfactual scenario to the state education 
grant reform is not a context with no talk about reforms at all, but a context with no specific retrench-
ment reform.  
In order to examine the coverage of the state education grant reform in closer detail, all articles 
mentioning the state education grant reform in the retrenchment coverage was coded for specific 
information on the reform. More specifically, this analysis examined 1) the context of the article, i.e. 
why the state education grant system was mentioned, and 2) any specific information on reforms. For 
the specific information on a reform, the main focus was on statements about specific parts of the 
state education grant reform. Noteworthy, the coverage was only analyzed for the nationwide news-
papers and might not be representative for the local coverage and the coverage in other types of media 
such as TV and radio. 
Table B.1 presents an overview of all articles in the study period. The table provides an English 
translation of the title of the article with the unique ID in the parenthesis, media outlet, date of publi-
cation, the context and reform information.  
 
Table B.1: Coverage of education reform retrenchments 
Title (id) Outlet Date Context  Information on reform 
Week 1 
The state education grant is a 
target (e397d634) 
Berlingske January 5 Information on reform 
plans from government 
sources. 
Considerations on how a 
education reform might 
look like. 
Interview: It will bomb the so-
cial mobility back to the Stone 
Age if you cut directly in the 
SU (e39824d8) 
Politiken January 6 Prime Minister Helle 
Thorning-SchmidtÕs 
New Year Address. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
     
Week 2 
Debate: Planned education re-
trenchments are short-sighted 
and expensive (e3991c29) 
Politiken January 9 Prime Minister Helle 
Thorning-SchmidtÕs 
New Year Address. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Debate: Thoughts on an state 
education grant reform 
Information January 11 Discussions about an 
education reform. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Debate: Why exactly the state 
education grant system? 
(e39aa14e) 
Information January 12 The need for welfare re-
trenchments. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Debate: Direction towards an 
unfair state education grant re-
form (e39a8a2d) 
Arbejderen January 12 Discussions about an 
education reform. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 








Retrenchment plans: Two bil-
lion requires radical changes 
(e3a1e572) 
Politiken January 31 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Debate: Reforms used to be 
something positive (e3a254cd) 
Arbejderen February 1 Years of welfare re-
trenchments. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Rectors in showdown with SU-
system (e3a2c1c0) 
Berlingske February 2 Ideas on how to reform 
the education grant sys-
tem. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
     
Week 6 




February 5 Protest against the pro-
posals made by univer-
sity rectors. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
State education grant cuts 




February 9 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
     
Week 7 
Debate: A  hope for Danish tra-
ditions (e3a83bf5) 
Information February 15 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
The Ministry of Finance puts 
pressure on ¯stergaard before 
state education grant reform 
(e3a82ef7) 
Politiken February 15 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system 
and in particular discus-
sions between the Min-
istry of Finance and 
Ministry of Education. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Debate: It will be expensive to 
retrench the state education 
grant system (e3a8284c) 
Politiken February 15 Rumors about retrench-
ment plans. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
     
Week 8 
Minister changed direction in 
the debate on the state educa-
tion grant reform (e3a96bf4) 
Kristeligt 
Dagblad 
February 19 Political debate about 
the reform. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Adolescents: Meaningless sav-
ings plan (e3a9ee99) 
Politiken February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Proposal for state education 
grant reform evokes relief 
(e3a9ee96) 
Politiken February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Debate: The necessary broken 
promise (e3a9f5f9) 
Information February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
The government has presented 
its state education grant reform 
(e3a9f4a2) 
Arbejderen February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Debate: State education grant 
reform Ð please reply 
(e3a9fa50) 
Information February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
ÔGentleÕ broken promises 
(e3a9f613) 
BT February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Debate: Morten vs. Morten 
(e3a9ee3e) 
Arbejderen February 20 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Debate: New presents for busi-
ness (e3a9f4b1) 
Arbejderen February 21 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. 
Demonstration against the state 
education grant reform 
(e3aa60f8) 
Arbejderen February 21 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
A lot of retrenchments 
(e3aa6102) 
Arbejderen February 21 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Students blocked the Faculty of 




February 22 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Debate: A happy student's se-
cret about the state education 
grant reform (e3aaf5c0) 
Information February 22 Information on retrench-
ment plans of the state 
education grant system. 
The government is pre-
paring an education re-
form. (Only the headline 
mention the reform.) 
Debate: "®h, b¾h, buh" - stu-
dent protests now (e3ab6d8a) 
Politiken February 23 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Analysis: The spoiled youth - 
intergenerational unity is in 
flux (e3ab5aec) 
Berlingske February 23 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Morten ¯stergaardsÕ beard 
(e3ab767e) 
Information February 23 General political analy-
sis not related to the re-
form. 
No information. 
Debate: State education grant 
reform (e3abaf85) 
Politiken February 24 Two letters to the editor 
arguing for and against 
the state education grant 
reform, respectively. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Is there a spindoctor? 
(e3abac35) 
Politiken February 24 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 




February 24 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
     
Week 9 
Harsh criticism of the govern-
mentsÕ reverse Robin Hood 
(e3ac4946) 
Berlingske February 26 The reform strategy of 
the government 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 




February 26 General political analy-
sis not related to the re-
form. 
No information. 




February 27 General political analy-
sis not related to the re-
form. 
No information. 
Students in full combat for the 
state education grant 
(e3ad3803) 
Arbejderen February 28 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Sleep is replaced with big 
meetings (e3ad380a) 
Arbejderen February 28 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
The battle does not end here 
(e3ae46ec) 
Arbejderen March 1 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Debate: The youth of today are 
a generation of complainers 
(e3aeb6bc) 
Politiken March 2 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Daylight robbery (e3aebc4b) Arbejderen March 2 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 




March 2 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
No information. 
Debate: Reject the state educa-
tion grant impairments 
(e3aebc0a) 
Arbejderen March 2 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Analysis: When internal con-
frontations took the life of an 
offensive (e3af1bd2) 
Politiken March 3 General political analy-
sis not related to the re-
form. 
No information. 
Chaos is restored (e3af1d0d) Politiken March 3 General political analy-
sis not related to the re-
form. 
No information. 
     
Week 10 
Debate: The state education 
grant and growth (e3af45f4) 
Jyllands-
Posten 
March 4 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Debate: You are perceived as 
heartless in you are in favor of 
the state education grant reform 
(e3afb846) 
Politiken March 5 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
     
Week 11 
You will get more protests 
(e3b4a9ac) 
Arbejderen March 15 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Specific information on 
the state education grant 
reform. 
Juggling with the students' live-
lihood (e3b4a9af) 
Arbejderen March 15 The presentation of the 
state education grant re-
form. 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
The state education grant re-
form costs the tip of a jet 
fighter (e3b50573) 
Arbejderen March 16 The reform strategy of 
the government 
Information on the state 
education grant reform. 
Note: All articles are collected through the media database Infomedia (infomedia.dk).  
 
Prior to the presentation of the reform, there was articles mentioning the potential for reforms 
in relation to the state education grant, and in particular articles discussing the reforming the state 
education grant in order to address a deficit of two billion Danish kroner. However, there was no 
specific information on the content of the reform or details on when and how a reform would be 
presented or implemented.  
After the presentation of the reform, there was not only an increase in the coverage of the state 
education grant reform, but also a more detailed coverage with information on the specific details on 
the reform. This included coverage on a shortened period of state education grant, additional require-
ments of progression in study programs in order for students to get the state education grant, require-
ments for the universities to improve student completion times, changed state education grants for 
people living with their parents, regulation of the state education grant as a transfer payment and 
more. In other words, the qualitative nature of the coverage changed after the presentation with the 
coverage being substantially more detailed and specific about an actual reform. 
The coverage after the presentation of the reform was about the specific reform and events in 
relation to the reform, e.g. student demonstrations against the content of the reform, in sharp contrast 
to the less specific coverage about potential reforms prior to the presentation. Importantly, and as 
described in the main text, there was coverage about potential reforms of the state education grant 
prior to February 19, but not in specific details (i.e. the qualitative aspects of the coverage) or to an 
extent as after the presentation (i.e. the quantitative aspects of the coverage). 
Last, two additional points are worth mentioning based on the analysis. First, some articles 
discussed the reform in relation to the general reform agenda of the government. Thus, it is likely that 
the public will not react to the specific reform, but an increase in the coverage of the overall reform 
agenda. Second, and as a caveat to the content analysis, a majority of the articles are from centre-left 
outlets (Politiken) and leftish outlets (Information and Arbejderen). One explanation might be that 
other outlets are less likely to mention the reform in relation to retrenchments, but rather frame the 
reform as rationalizations and improvements. 
C. Data: Dates of interviews 
Figure C.1: Date of interview, ESS, Denmark 
 
Figure C.1 shows the day of interview in the 6
th
 round of the European Social Survey for Denmark. 
The first interview was conducted on January 11 and the last on May 2. The dashed line in the fig-


















D. Data: Question wording 
Government satisfaction. Question: Now thinking about the Danish government, how satisfied are 
you with the way it is doing its job? Values: Extremely dissatisfied [0], Extremely satisfied [10] 
Education. Question: Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 
days? In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation. 
Male. Values: Male [1], Female [0]. 
Age. Derived from year born. 
Education level. Question: What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? 
Values: ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary [0], ES-ISCED II, lower secondary [1], ES-
ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary [2], ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary [3], 
ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational [4], ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education [5], ES-
ISCED V2, higher tertiary education [6]. 
Subjective class. Question: There are people who tend to be towards the top of our society and people 
who tend to be towards the bottom. On this card there is a scale that runs from top to bottom. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale nowadays? Values: Bottom of our society [0], 
Top of our society [10]. 
Political interest. Question: How interested would you say you are in politics Ð are you...? Values: 
Very interested [1], quite interested [2], hardly interested [3], or, not at all interested? [4]. 
Political news. Question: On an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is 
spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs? Values: No time at all 
[0], Less than ! hour [1], ! hour to 1 hour [2], More than 1 hour, up to 1! hours [3], More 
than 1! hours, up to 2 hours [4], More than 2 hours, up to 2! hours [5], More than 2! hours, 
up to 3 hours [6], More than 3 hours [7]. 
Religiosity. Question: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would 
you say you are? Values: Not at all religious [0], Very religious [10]. 
Ideology. Question: In politics people sometimes talk of ÒleftÓ and ÒrightÓ. Using this card, where 
would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? Values: 
Left [0], Right [10]. 
Life satisfaction. Question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
nowadays? Values: Extremely dissatisfied [0], Extremely satisfied [10]. 
Economy satisfaction. Question: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the 
economy in Denmark? Values: Extremely dissatisfied [0], Extremely satisfied [10]. 
Democracy satisfaction. Question: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy 
works in Denmark? Values: Extremely dissatisfied [0], Extremely satisfied [10]. 
Family proximity. Question 1: Which of the descriptions on this card applies to what he/she has been 
doing for the last 7 days? In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation. Question 
2: Including yourself, how many people Ð including children Ð live here regularly as members 
of this household? And in what year were you/was he/she born? 
Prospective family proximity. Question: Including yourself, how many people Ð including children Ð 
live here regularly as members of this household? And in what year were you/was he/she born? 
Paid work. Question: Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 
days? In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family 
business). 
Unemployed. Question: Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 
7 days? Unemployed (and actively looking for a job), unemployed (wanting a job but not ac-
tively looking for a job). 
Housework. Question: Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 
7 days? Doing housework, looking after children or other persons. 
 
E. Data: Description of the matching procedure 
The matching procedure ensures that the two groups are of equal size and that the people interviewed 
before and after were comparable on a set of covariates, namely gender, age, education status, edu-
cation level, subjective class, ideology, religiosity, political interest and political news consumption. 
The matching procedure results in a greater number of unmatched control cases (267 subjects) as a 
greater number of people were interviewed prior to the reform than after. For the treated group, 10 
cases were left unmatched. This provide a matched sample of 593 subjects interviewed before the 
reform and 593 interviewed after the reform.  
Figure E.1 shows the distribution of propensity scores before and after the matching procedure. 
If people interviewed after the presentation of the reform are comparable to the people interviewed 
before, there will be a complete overlap between the treatment and control group, and while there is 
a satisfactory overlap in the unmatched sample, there is a better overlap in the matched sample. 
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In order to examine the balance, Figure E.2 shows the standardized mean differences on the 
covariates prior to and after the matching procedure. The standardized mean differences are greater 
prior to the matching procedure, and there are some significant differences on age and political news 
consumption. Noteworthy, none of the differences are significant after the matching procedure. The 
likelihood ratio chi-square test for the unmatched data is 34,36 (df = 9, p < 0.01) and 1,58 (df = 9, p 
= 0.9965) for the matched data. The Nagelkerke R
2
 is 0.031 for the unmatched data and 0.002 for the 
matched data. 
 
Figure E.2: Balance between unmatched and matched sample 
 
 
































F. Data: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table F.1: Summary statistics, full data 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Government satisfaction 1,613 4.797 2.264 0 10 
Reform 1,613 0.411 0.492 0 1 
Education 1,650 0.166 0.372 0 1 
Male 1,650 0.505 0.500 0 1 
Age 1,650 48.701 19.016 16 97 
Education level 1,645 3.960 1.907 1 7 
Subjective class 1,617 6.434 1.545 0 10 
Political interest 1,648 2.868 0.764 1 4 
Political news 1,603 2.295 1.329 0 7 
Religiosity 1,643 4.197 2.684 0 10 
Ideology 1,585 5.338 2.372 0 10 
 
Table F.2: Summary statistics, matched data 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Government satisfaction 1,186 4.773 2.234 0 10 
Reform 1,186 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Education 1,186 0.172 0.378 0 1 
Male 1,186 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Age 1,186 46.277 17.929 16 93 
Education level 1,186 4.024 1.870 1 7 
Subjective class 1,186 6.470 1.527 0 10 
Political interest 1,186 2.866 0.745 1 4 
Political news 1,186 2.187 1.258 0 7 
Religiosity 1,186 4.209 2.645 0 10 




G. Results: Matching specifications 
 
To test the sensitivity of the results to the choices of the matching procedure, several models were 
estimated with different specifications. First, Table G.1 provide the results on the full data, i.e. the 
results prior to any preprocessing of the data. The table show that the results hold prior to any match-
ing procedure, substantiating that the estimates provided in the main text is not conditional upon a 
specific model. 
Table G.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, full data, OLS regression!





 (0.11) -0.19 (0.13) -0.18 (0.12) 
Education  0.07 (0.12)  0.06 (0.12) 





Male  0.01 (0.003)  0.01 (0.004) 
Age  0.15
***
 (0.03)  0.15
***
 (0.03) 
Education level  0.18
***
 (0.04)  0.18
***
 (0.04) 
Subjective class  -0.11 (0.08)  -0.11 (0.08) 
Pol. interest  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.05) 
Pol. news  0.11
***





 (0.02)  -0.18
***
 (0.02) 










Observations 1,577 1,473 1,577 1,473 
R
2
 0.004 0.10 0.01 0.10 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 






The models presented in the main text use a single caliper choice. The caliper choice determines 
which control units are matched to treated units, and to examine the robustness of the caliper choice, 
Figure G.1 show the interaction coefficients from several models with different calipers. The models 
further controls for the covariates described and used in the main text. Overall, the figure shows that 
the results are robust, although the level of significance vary slightly. Accordingly, some models have 
0 in the 95% confidence interval and a single model also in the 90% confidence interval. However, 
this is what to be expected based on the number of models being estimated.  
 
 
Figure G.1: Results using different calipers with nearest neighbor matching  
 
 
Note: The heterogeneous effect of the reform using different calipers (from 0.01 to 0.25). Matched 
on the variables described in the main text and with the covariates used in the full model in the man-
uscript (Column 5, Table 1). The thin vertical lines indicate 95% confidence interval and the thick 
vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.  
 
 
An additional concern is related to balance in the covariates between people undergoing edu-
cation. More specifically, the people undergoing education in the sample might differ on several 
characteristics before and after the presentation of the reform with implications for the propensity to 
being treated. To take this possibility into account, the matching procedure was conducted with each 
covariate interacted with education status, i.e. a more flexible functional form. Table G.2 show the 
results when estimating the key parameters on the sample with the covariates-education matching 
data. Overall, this provide more conservative estimates, mostly due to a stronger effect in the general 
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Table G.2: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, covariates-education matching!





 (0.12) -0.16 (0.14) -0.12 (0.14) 
Education   0.03 (0.24) 0.19 (0.27) 
Reform×Education   -0.65* (0.34) -0.67** (0.33) 
Male  0.08 (0.13)  0.06 (0.13) 
Age  0.003 (0.004)  0.001 (0.005) 
Education level  0.15
***
 (0.04)  0.14
***
 (0.04) 
Subjective class  0.19
***
 (0.04)  0.19
***
 (0.04) 
Pol. interest  -0.16
*
 (0.09)  -0.16
*
 (0.09) 
Pol. news  -0.04 (0.06)  -0.04 (0.06) 
Religiosity  0.11
***

















Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 
R
2
 0.004 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 





Last, the results were estimated using optimal and full matching techniques. Table G.3 show 
the results using the data sets with optimal and full matching for a model with the interaction between 
the reform and education status and a model with statistical control for the covariates as well. In sum, 
the results are substantially identical to the results presented in the main text. 
  
 Table G.3: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, optimal and full matching 
Matching Optimal Optimal Full Full 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.17 (0.14) -0.17 (0.14) -0.19 (0.13) -0.19 (0.12) 










Male  0.02 (0.13)  0.07 (0.12) 
Age  0.005 (0.005)  0.01 (0.004) 
Education level  0.16
***
 (0.04)  0.16
***
 (0.03) 
Subjective class  0.18
***
 (0.04)  0.18
***
 (0.04) 
Pol. interest  -0.11 (0.09)  -0.13 (0.08) 
Pol. news  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.05) 
Religiosity  0.10
***

















Observations 1,206 1,206 1,463 1,463 
R
2
 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 
p < 0.05, 
*** 





H. Results: Time trend control 
To test whether the results hold when taking the day of the interview into account, Table H.1 show a 
series of regressions mimicking the key results presented in the manuscript with the addition of a 
statistical control for the distance in days to the presentation of the reform (February 19). The results 
are substantially identical to the results presented in Table 1 in the manuscript. In other words, taking 
the specific distance in the day of interview into account have no implications for the results. 
 
Table H.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, time trend control, OLS regression!















Education   0.10 (0.24) 0.39 (0.27) 
Reform×Education   -0.69** (0.34) -0.70** (0.33) 
Male  0.13 (0.13)  0.12 (0.13) 
Age  0.004 (0.004)  0.004 (0.005) 
Education level  0.17
***
 (0.04)  0.18
***
 (0.04) 
Subjective class  0.20
***
 (0.04)  0.20
***
 (0.04) 
Pol. interest  -0.12 (0.09)  -0.11 (0.09) 
Pol. news  -0.04 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.05) 
Religiosity  0.10
***

















Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 
R
2
 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 





I. Results: Regression discontinuity design estimates 
In order to test whether there was a discontinuity in government satisfaction after the presentation of 
the reform, a regression discontinuity design was used to estimate the local average treatment effect 
identified at the cutoff point, c, i.e. the day the reform was presented. The design utilizes a sharp 
discontinuity, i.e. a conditional probability of treatment at the threshold value going from 0 to 1.
1
 
The limitation of the design in this context is the requirement of a large N to estimate the local 
effect. In the sample, we are substantially limited by the small number of interviews, i.e. 274 persons 
undergoing education over the full period with several days with no observations at all. As a result, 
the RDD estimates are only estimated for the full sample. Furthermore, the bandwidth choice is cru-
cial as a lower bandwidth reduces the risk of bias but further reduces the number of observations 
(Green et al. 2009; Robinson et al. 2009). Accordingly, the models are estimated on the full data set 
as well as a limited period excluding people interviewed more than 45 days before or after the presen-
tation of the reform. 
To estimate the RDD effects we rely on the robust nonparametric procedure described in Calo-
nico et al. (2014). These procedures result in conventional, bias corrected and robust estimates. Ac-
cordingly, we have six estimates (two samples with three estimates for each sample). Table I.1 shows 
the local average treatment effect of the reform for the full and limited data and the different estimates. 
 
Table I.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, RDD estimates 




























N 1613 1613 1613 1493 1493 1493 
Note: RDD estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is government 
satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satisfaction with the govern-
ment. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 
p < 0.05, 
*** 
p < 0.01 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 Formally, the parameter of interest is: � = 	 lim
(	↓∗
�[�(1)|� = �] − lim
(	↑∗
�[�(0)|� = �]. 
 Across all models, we find that there is a discontinuity in the satisfaction with the government when 
the reform is presented. Figure I.1 visualize this discontinuity based on the robust model with the 
limited data.  
 













































































J. Results: Announcement of reform 
Although there was no evidence in the media coverage that the reform was presented in detail prior 
to February 19, we examine the possibility that people reacted to the reform prior to the presenta-
tion. In order to do this, we estimate differences in government support creating groups using the 
respondents interviewed prior to the reform. The first group consists of people interviewed within 
the week (seven days) before the reform was presented which we compare to the remainder of the 
people interviewed prior to the reform was presented. The procedure is then repeated using other 
days as announcement dates, resulting in a series of estimates using groups within one week (seven 
days) and three weeks (21 days) prior to the reform.  
Figure J.1 shows the effect estimates of the 15 estimated models. The results show two inter-
esting aspects. First, we find no significant effects in any of the models, substantiating that there 
were no announcement effects in the period prior to the presentation of the reform. Second, all esti-
mates, while non-significant, are positive, and thus in the opposite direction of what should be ex-
pected, had there been an announcement effect.  
 



































K. Results: Proximity models 
In the main text, the models provided evidence on four different types of proximity. One of the models 
tested whether being proximate to family most likely to receive the state education grant reacted more 
strongly the reform.  In Table K.1, we test an additional type of family proximity, namely prospective 
proximity, i.e. whether the respondent was living with kids below the age threshold of the state edu-
cation grant, and as a result, likely to receive the state education grant at some point in the future. The 
results show that prospective family proximity did not condition the impact of the reform. 
 
Table K.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, prospective family proximity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Reform -0.23 (0.16) -0.23 (0.15) -0.23 (0.15) 
Prospective family 0.19 (0.19) 0.13 (0.19) 0.09 (0.20) 
Reform×Prospective  
family 
-0.20 (0.27) -0.16 (0.27) -0.17 (0.27) 
Male  0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) 
Age  0.01 (0.004) 0.002 (0.01) 





Pol. interest  0.03 (0.09) 0.03 (0.09) 




















Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 
R
2
 0.01 0.08 0.08 
 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 
p < 0.05, 
*** 
p < 0.01. 
 
 
In the main text, it was also examined whether socioeconomic characteristics conditioned the impact 
of the reform. More specifically, a model tested whether having been doing paid work within the last 
seven days mattered for the impact of the reform. Here, we expand this analysis in two ways. First, 
by including other types of characteristics (being unemployed and doing housework). Second, by 
running a full model with all characteristics. Table K.2 show the different models and provide evi-
dence that the other characteristics did not shape the response to the reform, and that the direct prox-
imity mattered across all models. 
 
Table K.2:  Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, socioeconomic proximities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.42
*
 (0.23) -0.11 (0.14) -0.10 (0.17) -0.27 (0.26) 










Paid work -0.32 (0.20)   -0.25 (0.22) 
Reform×Paid work 0.39 (0.27)   0.31 (0.29) 
Unemployed  0.58 (0.37)  0.40 (0.41) 
Reform×Unemployed  -0.74 (0.55)  -0.55 (0.58) 
Housework   0.06 (0.18) 0.09 (0.18) 
Reform×Housework   -0.16 (0.26) -0.20 (0.26) 
Male -0.003 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) -0.01 (0.13) 0.002 (0.13) 










Pol. interest 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) 




























Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 
R
2
 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 
p < 0.05, 
*** 




L. Results: Standardized regression coefficients  
 
 
Table L.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, OLS regression!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform -0.07 (0.13) -0.06 (0.12) -0.04 (0.14) -0.04 (0.14) 
Education   0.02 (0.24) 0.07 (0.27) 
Reform×Education   -0.09 (0.34) -0.09 (0.33) 
Age  0.03 (0.004)  0.03 (0.005) 
Education level  0.15 (0.04)  0.15 (0.04) 
Subjective class  0.14 (0.04)  0.14 (0.04) 
Pol. interest  -0.04 (0.09)  -0.03 (0.09) 
Pol. news  -0.02 (0.06)  -0.02 (0.05) 
Religiosity  0.12 (0.02)  0.12 (0.02) 
Ideology  -0.18 (0.03)  -0.18 (0.03) 
Constant 0.00 (0.09) 0.00 (0.39) 0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.43) 
Observations 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186 
R
2
 0.004 0.10 0.01 0.10 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satisfac-




M. Results: Matching on education status  
 
An important concern is that it is not education status that explain the change in government support 
as a result of the reform, but factors which correlate with education status. More specifically, the 
results might be caused by the endogenous exposure to education in particular with regard to political 
preferences and support. Thus, we want to ensure that education status is conditionally exogenous.  
This aspect was tested empirically in two different ways. First, by interacting education status 
with all the covariates in explaining government support. This is a direct way to test whether the 
relevance of education status is conditional upon the covariates in explaining government support. 
Second, by applying the propensity score matching procedure on education status. More specifically, 
to further make education status (the sectional dimension) a function of the covariates and interactions 
between the covariates and reform exposure (the longitudinal dimension). 
 





































Reform × Pol. news
Reform × Pol. interest
Reform × Subjective class
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Figure M.1 shows the balance before and after matching on education status. Importantly, there 
is no difference in reform exposure. While there are some differences in the overall level of education 
and political news consumption, the greatest difference between people undergoing education and 
not is age. Not surprisingly, people undergoing education are substantially younger than the general 
public. Overall, the matching procedure provides comparable groups while also reducing the sample. 
Accordingly, after the matching procedure, we have 230 respondents. 
 
Table M.1: Welfare retrenchment and government satisfaction, education matched sample, OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







 (0.39) 2.88 (1.87) 
Reform×Education -0.71** (0.33) -1.56** (0.62) -1.51** (0.61) -1.60** (0.62) 
Male 0.19 (0.15)  0.23 (0.32) 0.54 (0.47) 
Age 0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Education level 0.19
***
 (0.04)  0.12 (0.10) 0.16 (0.16) 
Subjective class 0.24
***
 (0.05)  0.08 (0.09) 0.19 (0.13) 
Pol. interest -0.09 (0.10)  -0.16 (0.21) -0.25 (0.28) 
Pol. news -0.01 (0.06)  0.02 (0.14) 0.05 (0.20) 
Religiosity 0.09
***
 (0.03)  0.07 (0.06) -0.01 (0.10) 
Ideology -0.18
***





Education×Male -0.44 (0.34)   -0.63 (0.66) 
Education×Age -0.02 (0.03)   -0.03 (0.03) 
Education×Education level -0.02 (0.13)   -0.07 (0.21) 
Education×Subjective class -0.22
**
 (0.11)   -0.27 (0.19) 
Education×Pol. interest -0.15 (0.25)   0.19 (0.43) 
Education×Pol. news -0.21 (0.16)   -0.06 (0.29) 
Education×Religiosity 0.02 (0.06)   0.12 (0.13) 










Observations 1,186 230 230 230 
R
2
 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.16 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is government satisfaction (0 to 10), with greater values indicating greater levels of satis-
faction with the government. 
* 
p < 0.1, 
** 




Table M.1 shows the results. In the first model, we let education status interact with all the 
covariates in explaining government support. In the second model, we test whether people similar to 
each other with the exception of education status reacted differently to the reform. Again, we find 
that people undergoing education were substantially and significantly less supportive of the govern-
ment as a result of the reform. The third model includes the covariates and the fourth model includes 
the covariates and the covariate-education interactions. In the models, people undergoing education 
are still substantially and significantly less supportive of the government. 
Overall, this suggest that it is education status and not other factors, e.g. age differences between 
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